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Abstract
Background: Every safety-critical industry devotes considerable time and resource to investigating and analysing
accidents, incidents and near misses. The systematic analysis of incidents has greatly expanded our understanding
of both the causes and prevention of harm. These methods have been widely employed in healthcare over the last
20 years but are now subject to critique and reassessment. In this paper, we reconsider the purpose and value of
incident analysis and methods appropriate to the healthcare of today.
Main text: The primary need for a revised vision of incident analysis is that healthcare itself is changing dramatically.
People are living longer, often with multiple co-morbidities which are managed over very long timescales. Our vision
of safety analysis needs to expand concomitantly to embrace much longer timescales. Rather than think only in terms
of the prevention of specific incidents, we need to consider the balance of benefit, harm and risks over long time
periods encompassing the social and psychological impact of healthcare as well as physical effects.
We argued for major changes in our approach to the analysis of safety events: assume that patients and families will be
partners in investigation and where possible engage them fully from the beginning, examine much longer time periods
and assess contributory factors at different time points in the patient journey, be more proportionate and strategic in
analysing safety issues, seek to understand success and recovery as well as failure, consider the workability of clinical
processes as well as deviations from them and develop a much more structured and wide-ranging approach to
recommendations.
Conclusions: Previous methods of incident analysis were simply adopted and disseminated with little research
into the concepts, methods, reliability and outcomes of such analyses. There is a need for significant research and
investment in the development of new methods. These changes are profound and will require major adjustments in
both practical and cultural terms and research to explore and evaluate the most effective approaches.
Keywords: Patient safety, Incident analysis, Safety interventions
Background
Every safety-critical industry devotes considerable time
and resource to investigating and analysing accidents, inci-
dents and near misses. Such industries employ many
methods for assessing safety. Incident reporting and inves-
tigation, often called ‘lagging indicators’ are complemen-
ted by what are termed ‘leading indicators’, such as human
reliability analysis, safety audits and horizon-scanning for
future migrations from safety procedures. While lagging
indicators focus on learning from failure and non-
compliance, leading indicators support organisations to
anticipate future safety risks. There is a rich literature
outlining the benefits and limitations of specific types
of lagging and leading indicators, and it is generally ac-
cepted that how well an organisation combines learning
from the two types of indicators optimises safety per-
formance [1–3]. Analyses of safety issues in any indus-
try therefore requires review of a range of information
[4, 5]; nevertheless, the identification and analysis of
serious incidents and adverse events continues to be a
critical stimulus and guide for safety improvement.
Implementation science has primarily focussed on im-
proving the uptake of existing research evidence, interven-
tions and policy but may also address the development of
interventions. The findings of incident analysis can be
valuable here in identifying vulnerabilities in systems and
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suggesting interventions that may improve safety and reli-
ability. This may occur through the analysis of single inci-
dents within an organisation or through aggregated
analyses of incidents at a national level. For instance, Rees
et al. [6] recently reviewed 2191 paediatric safety inci-
dents, including 12 deaths and 41 cases of severe harm. In
their examination review of potential solutions to the
problems identified, they prioritised medication provision
in community pharmacies; triage processes to enable ef-
fective and timely assessment, diagnosis and referral of
acutely sick children attending out-of-hours services; and
enhanced communication for robust safety netting be-
tween professionals and parents [6]. The analysis of inci-
dents can therefore act as a powerful stimulus and guide
to the development and implementation of interventions
to improve healthcare.
A critical challenge for patient safety in earlier years
was to develop a more thoughtful approach to both
error and harm to patients [7, 8]. While a particular
action or omission may be the immediate cause of an
incident, closer analysis usually reveals a series of
events and departures from safe practice, each influ-
enced by the working environment and the wider
organizational context [9, 10]. We previously ex-
tended Reason’s organisational accident model and
adapted it for use in healthcare, classifying the error
producing conditions and organizational factors in a
single broad framework of factors affecting clinical
practice [7]. This gave rise to a method of incident
analysis often referred to as ALARM [11] and a later
revision and extension in 2004 [12] (the ‘London
Protocol’) which has been translated into several
languages and can be applied to all areas of healthcare
including the acute sector, mental health, and primary
care. Similar methods, usually referred to as ‘root cause
analysis’, have been developed and implemented by a
number of organisations [8, 13]. In this paper, we have
chosen not to use the term root cause analysis as, like
other commentators, we believe that the ideal of a single
root cause is thoroughly misleading [14, 15].
The systematic analysis of incidents has greatly ex-
panded our understanding of both the causes and pre-
vention of harm. These analyses have been conducted
in multiple clinical settings and have revealed both the
range of vulnerabilities in health systems but also the
many factors that may contribute to error [6, 16–19].
For instance, in a review of medication-related inci-
dents [20], Dean and colleagues identified a wide var-
iety of specific errors and contributory factors which in
turn suggested methods of intervention and error re-
duction. These approaches have been widely employed
in healthcare over the last 20 years but are now subject
to critique and reassessment [5, 15, 21, 22]. We need to
reconsider the purpose and value of incident analysis
and develop methods appropriate to the healthcare of
today.
The need for reassessment
The primary need for a revised vision of incident analysis
is that healthcare itself is changing dramatically [4]. People
are living longer, often with multiple co-morbidities which
are managed over very long timescales. Care is increas-
ingly being delivered in the home and in community set-
tings; patients and families are increasingly and
necessarily in charge of their own care. The emphasis
and indeed purpose of healthcare is changing from one
of healing and restoration to health to the longer term
aim of supporting well-being in the face of chronic dis-
ease and increasing frailty [23]. The focus of care is
moving from the hospital to the home and community
which means that we need to pay much more attention
to safety issues that arise outside at home, in the com-
munity and in primary care settings.
We have recently argued [4] that our vision of safety
analysis needs to expand concomitantly to embrace
much longer timescales. The analysis of specific inci-
dents remains important but there is increasing evidence
that the harm and failures of care that patients may suf-
fer are often due to an accumulation of problems over a
long time period across multiple contexts [24, 25]. For
instance, many hospital admissions for older people are
due to adverse drug events, particularly those due to the
interaction of multiple medications over a long period of
time. Analyses of incidents generally limited to a single
hospital admission or to a specific event in primary care
but many adverse drug events can only be understood
by examining decisions and events along the patient
journey. In the case of an admission to hospital with a
complex drug reaction, a full understanding of the event
might only be achieved by tracking the history of the pa-
tient’s care over several months leading up to the admis-
sion. Patients’ and carers’ perspectives are rarely sought
and yet they may be the only people who can provide a
picture of the care delivered over long time periods [4].
The second major reason for a reassessment is that
many of the analyses that are conducted do not lead to
effective actions or improvements. Reviews conducted
by healthcare organisations suggest that the implementa-
tion and quality of incident analysis can be highly vari-
able and is often poor [5, 8, 15, 26]. Organisations are
often under pressure to deliver a large number of man-
dated investigation reports which means that the ana-
lyses can degenerate into a bureaucratic process in
which the only outcome is the production of a report
identifying ‘root causes’ and making formulaic and
largely unachievable recommendations. For instance, in
a recent analysis of 302 incident analyses, Kellog and
colleagues [27] found that the most common
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recommendations were for more training and the
reinforcement of existing policies neither of which, even
if implemented, were likely to have any substantial im-
pact on the problems uncovered. They found that mul-
tiple event types were repeated in the study period in
the same organisation, despite repeated analyses. This
suggests that we have perhaps been too optimistic in as-
suming that a thoughtful analysis would lead naturally
to reasonable and effective recommendations; rather, we
need to give much more thought to how recommenda-
tions and interventions should be derived from incident
analysis data and to draw on a richer set of recommen-
dations and responses [4, 6].
Main text
Understanding the whole patient journey: an illustrative
case
To assist our reflections on the future of safety analysis, it
is helpful to reflect on an illustrative story of the death of
a person with mental health problems from a cardiac ar-
rest while being treated as an inpatient and after having
been prescribed a new generation of anti-psychotic drugs
(Table 1). The story demonstrates the valuable insights we
can get from seeing events through the eyes of the patient
and how the time frame for analysis needs to cover the pa-
tient’s journey from the point of them presenting with
symptoms across multiple healthcare providers.
Supporting and treating patients with co-existing mental
ill health and physical health symptoms can be very chal-
lenging, and it is perhaps easy with hindsight to say that
this person’s own account of her cardiac symptoms should
have been taken more seriously. It is clear however that
the healthcare professionals involved became fixated on
persuading patient B to take a medication she was reluc-
tant to use. Over time, her feelings of anxiety about taking
clozapine increased and she exhibited increasing paranoia,
believing the healthcare team were encouraging her to
take a medication that was harmful to her cardiac health.
She was in fact entirely correct in her assessment.
The scope of the hospital investigation into patient B’s
death focused on the period from the time of her acute
inpatient admission to her death on the ward. The fact
that she had been seen as a ‘non-complaint’ patient and
the events leading up to her admission were hardly con-
sidered at all. The care given by the hospital in the last
days of the patient’s life was in fact of good quality and
shed little light on the reasons for her decline and un-
timely death. Had the time frame for analysis been ex-
tended to capture the last months and years of the
patient’s healthcare journey and investigated how the
drift away from treatment recommended in guidelines
occurred, the findings from the analysis may have been
very different. They would, for instance, have focused
more on how using persuasion as a strategy to convince
a mental health service user who is raising concerns
about their prescribed medications leads to a breakdown
in the therapeutic relationship between care provider
and patient and prolonged psychological harm.
This illustrative story serves to introduce some of the
changes needed in our approach to analysing the risks of
healthcare. We clearly need to examine much longer time
periods, but the changes needed are much more than an
extension of the current methodology, even though many
of the underlying concepts and methods can still provide
a relevant foundation. In particular, we need to look at
fewer incidents in much greater depth, to be led much
more by patients, to seek to understand success and re-
covery as well as failure and finally to consider an ex-
panded repertoire of responses and recommendations.
Seven major changes to adverse event analysis
Widen the time frame of analysis: review the patient
journey
In many cases, the time period encompassed by safety
analysis will need to be extended to examine a significant
portion of the patient’s journey through the healthcare sys-
tem, exploring the safety of the patient journey through
time. This is different to simply examining the causal history
Table 1 A mental health service user dies of a cardiac arrest
A mental health service user died from a cardiac arrest whilst being
treated as an inpatient after being admitted to an acute mental health
ward. Patient B had been prescribed a new generation anti-psychotic
drug used in the treatment of schizophrenia (clozapine). Review of
patient B’s notes over a 4-year time frame identified several recorded
entries where she had raised concerns about the cardiac side effects of
clozapine. She had been experiencing heart palpitations and was
diagnosed with tachycardia following referral for cardiac review.
During this 4-year time frame, patient B was living independently in the
community, supported by her family, a community mental health team
and GP. She made repeated requests for her medication to be changed
to the GP and community mental health team. Her concerns were not
acted on even though the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE) guidelines on the prevention and management of
schizophrenia emphasise that the choice of anti-psychotic medication
should take the patient’s views into account:
The United Kingdom NICE Guideline CG 178, Psychosis and Schizophrenia
in Adults: prevention and Management states: ‘The choice of antipsychotic
medication should be made by the service user and healthcare
professional together, taking into account the views of the carer if the
service user agrees. Provide information and discuss the likely benefits and
possible side effects of each drug, including:
• metabolic (including weight gain and diabetes)
• extrapyramidal (including akathisia, dyskinesia and dystonia)
• cardiovascular (including prolonging the QT interval)
• hormonal (including increasing plasma prolactin)
• other (including unpleasant subjective experiences).’
Because of the physical symptoms she was experiencing, patient B
repeatedly stopped taking clozapine. The healthcare professionals
involved in her care focused on persuading patient B she should keep
taking clozapine. There is no evidence anyone considered ‘Patient B is
experiencing physical side effects from taking clozapine. The heart
palpitations she is experiencing are causing considerable anxiety. She is
at high risk of medication non-compliance.’ She eventually died of a
cardiac arrest while in hospital for her mental health problems.
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of factors that led to the occurrence of one particular event.
Many patients suffer significant harm because of multiple
small failures that accumulate throughout their care, rather
than a single dramatic failure at one point in time [24, 28–
30]. We already understand that after an incident we need
to look back to the series of factors that combined to create
a single harmful event—for instance, a young doctor is un-
supervised at night with inadequate equipment, a difficult
team and a very sick patient. More often though, in the care
of a patient over time, we see a progressive degradation in
care due to a combination of errors and system vulnerabil-
ities that accumulate over a long period.
Amalberti and colleagues [31, 32] have previously ar-
gued that we should extend the time frame of analysis to
consider an ‘event journey’. However, to examine safety
over longer time periods, particularly in community set-
tings, we now believe that we should speak simply of the
patient journey. This will require looking back through
the medical history of the patient in search for all events
that have defined the patient’s journey and contributed
to the final outcome, whether or not these events have
been perceived as serious at the time they occurred or
whether the problem was detected and resolved. In this
scenario, we will need to try to understand, without the
benefit of hindsight, both the benefits and risks of cer-
tain courses of action and how sometimes risks will be
knowingly and acceptably taken because of the benefits
incurred. A simple but important example is the frail
person who elects to stay at home rather than be cared
for in a residential setting; this course is medically more
risky, but the risks are outweighed by the wider social
and psychological benefits.
The suggestion that we might extend our analysis
to longer time periods raises a number of questions
about the definition and identification of events that
would be suitable and productive for analysis. The
word ‘incident’ does not seem entirely appropriate
when considering a series of events that might grad-
ually unfold over several months and some new ter-
minology might be required. We might instead speak
of a ‘safety analysis of the patient journey’ over a par-
ticular time period. We would also need to identify
the trigger events which might lead to such analyses.
In the first instance, these might be familiar adverse
events which on initial inspection suggest a long gen-
esis. In time, we might be able to identify unsafe pe-
riods of patient care, although this is not easy with
current information systems.
Work with patients and families to identify, define and
prioritise safety issues
Identifying periods of time when care has been unsafe is
difficult with current systems firstly because they are not
oriented to detecting problems of this kind and secondly
because most healthcare staff will only be aware of par-
ticular episodes within the patient journey. One poten-
tial solution is to analyse some incidents that are
selected by patients rather than by professionals to gain
a wider coverage of the landscape of potential problems.
Incidents currently selected for analysis by professionals
tend to be those that have the most immediate and most
visible impact in a particular clinical context. The longer
term problems that patients can experience as they re-
ceive care across different clinical settings over long pe-
riods of time are invisible to most professionals not
because they are unwilling to see them but simply be-
cause the information is not readily available [33, 34].
We already know that patients and families are able to
reliably identify adverse events that have not been de-
tected by professionals. Patients have been shown in a
number of studies to report errors and adverse events
accurately and to provide additional information not
available to healthcare professionals [34–37]. We suggest
that events considered for analysis should be selected
from the patient’s point of view as well as by profes-
sionals. We do not yet know what other kind of events
might be identified as worthy of investigation by patients
and families but they may be quite different from those
identified by professionals. Developing methods to iden-
tify significant events identified by patients will be chal-
lenging and will likely require collaboration between
families and professionals to select events and thematic
issues that provide the most fruitful insights [38].
The inclusion of patients and families in both selection
and analysis is likely to profoundly affect both the focus
and findings of safety analyses. We might anticipate for
instance that much more attention will be given to psy-
chological and social issues, that communication and the
coordination of care between providers [34] will be a
dominant theme and that the cognitive and emotional
demands of caring will emerge as a safety issue in its
own right.
Conduct fewer, deeper and more proportionate analyses
Healthcare organisations have finite resources for safety
investigation and analysis, and these resources are fre-
quently consumed by the demands of outside agencies.
Staff can become understandably frustrated and bur-
dened by requirements for time-consuming incident
investigation carried out without adequate time or suffi-
cient training. Much greater investment in training in
safety analysis is certainly needed [15]. But more funda-
mentally, much more care and attention needs to be
paid in selecting which incidents would be suitable for
extensive analysis, particularly in terms of the likely im-
provements to patient safety. The depth and extent of
the analysis conducted should ideally be proportionate
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to the value of the potential learning and improvements
that are likely to result.
Some tragic events must be investigated because the
patient and family need an explanation and support; this
is right and necessary, and healthcare organisations have
a moral responsibility to respond to families who have
suffered [39–41]. However, these are not necessarily the
events which provide the greatest insights into the
strengths and vulnerabilities of the healthcare system.
For the purposes of safety improvement, a fairly drastic
‘triage’ process should be carried out. Some issues can
be reviewed fairly rapidly by a clinical team in a team
meeting, while others with wider implications may re-
quire longer and more extensive analysis possibly coordi-
nated across multiple organisations [42]. At present, the
main criteria for choosing incidents within organisations
is the severity of outcome, although at national level, in-
vestigations may be prioritised because they are address-
ing issues that have widespread implications for the
whole system of care [43, 44]. Severity of outcome could
remain a criterion for longer term analyses, but we
might also want to prioritise events that were likely to
reveal problems not highlighted in current systems;
these would certainly include problems that arose within
the patient’s home, breakdowns in coordination of care
across providers and difficulties in transitions between
providers of care.
Such long-term analyses would be resource intensive.
We suggest however that an extensive analysis of 10 in-
cidents a year across clinical settings would provide just
as rich an understanding of the landscape, richer than
100 rushed and formulaic analyses. A deep investigation
of 10 incidents in a given clinical area over a year would
reveal enough insight for several years’ worth of further
exploration and improvement. Findings from such ana-
lyses must then be considered in the context of other
safety relevant information [45] and the longer term or-
ganisational strategy for improving the quality and safety
of care.
Applying a more proportionate approach to prioritis-
ing analytic resources also requires a flexible portfolio of
analytic strategies. For example, productive analyses of
minor issues can be carried out rapidly in a few minutes
in a team meeting [39] or perhaps used as the basis for
reflection in a larger clinical or organisational meeting.
Where more detailed analysis may be required, escalat-
ing approaches such as concise analysis tools [42], a
rapid SWARM analysis [46] through to system level re-
views [47]. These all represent different approaches to
reflection and investigation of safety issues at different
levels across an organisation, which is foundational prac-
tice in other safety critical industries [43]. The critical
point is to triage incidents and events and customise an
appropriate degree of inquiry.
Understand success and failure in detection and recovery
Analyses and reports should identify, and indeed cele-
brate, good treatment as well as pointing out failures in
the care process [48, 49]. More subtly, we also need to
pay more attention to both successes and failures of de-
tection, anticipation and recovery [4]. There is much to
learn from the ability of the system to detect and recover
from failures and close calls [38, 50]. For example, in
addition to identifying failures and contributory factors,
we could instead ask ‘what successes and failures of re-
sponse and recovery occurred in the care of this pa-
tient?’ and ‘how we can we improve detection and
recovery in settings such as these?’ These questions are
fundamental to understanding how safety functions and
risk controls work effectively—and how they break down
[9]. They are also central to many prospective risk ana-
lysis methods, such as Bow Tie analysis [51] and Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis [52]. Bow Tie analysis, for in-
stance, has been extensively used in the aviation sector
to identify and communicate risk information effectively.
Carrying out a prospective analysis of a safety risk using
the Bow Tie method involves asking a structured set of
questions prospectively addressing the nature of a haz-
ard, the circumstances that lead to danger, the impact of
loss of control and the means of recovery and mitigation
of any harms. Bow Tie diagrams illustrate a hazard, the
undesirable event, trigger events (threats) and potential
outcomes; they also show the risk controls put in place
to minimise the risk. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis,
occasionally used in healthcare, [53–55] is another ana-
lytical method that provides a systematic and structured
approach to identifying potential sources and conse-
quences of failure. A key stage of this method involves
identifying how potential failures might be detected and
responded to if they actually occur.
We should also give serious consideration to examin-
ing events and episodes where a successful recovery oc-
curred which would be supportive of staff morale and
also instructive in revealing successful adaptive strat-
egies, such as ‘good catch’ programmes in healthcare
that seek to analyse and understand events where staff
effectively detected and recovered from potentially
harmful events [56]. This would have implications both
for our understanding of events and, more importantly,
for the recommendations which follow such analyses
which might expand to include a much stronger focus
on developing detection and recovery strategies.
Examine safety issues and contributory factors at different
time points
The original ALARM/LONDON protocol proposed that,
after the initial care delivery problems were identified,
each should be analysed separately to consider the con-
tributory factors [11]. In a sequence of problems,
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different sets of contributory factors may be associated
with each specific problem. For instance, a nurse might
fail to ask for advice about a deteriorating patient due to
inexperience, poor supervision and deficiencies in team-
work; in contrast, the same patient might later fail to re-
ceive the correct medication, but this might be due to
inadequate staffing and poor organisation of care. With
an analysis over a relatively short timescale, this more
complex analysis may not be carried out and all the con-
tributory factors may be considered together; in fact,
techniques such as the fish bone causal diagram actively
promote the aggregation of all contributory factors into
a single amalgam. Much of the value of mapping out the
complex patterns of factors and conditions that underlie
safety issues is therefore lost, as fine-grained explana-
tions of how events evolve and interlink can instead give
way to simplistic lists [57]. However, this more subtle
perspective becomes much more important with a lon-
ger timescale as a series of problems may be identified
which are clearly separated in time and context. Each of
these can be separately analysed using the ALARM grid
to build up a much more detailed picture of system
vulnerabilities.
Reflect on the workability of the underlying care process
Any safety analysis begins by comparing what actually
happened with what ideally should have happened. In-
deed, it is typically a dramatic mismatch between what
was expected and what actually happened that alerts or-
ganisations to a serious safety problem in the first place
[58]. Analysing incidents in terms of the gap between
the way work is expected to be done and what actually
occurs is a central strategy in detecting the early signs of
emerging safety problems [59–61]. Comparing how
work is actually done and how it is imagined is one of
the primary learning opportunities offered by incident
analysis in other industries [43]. For example, in airline
incident reporting and investigation systems, safety in-
vestigators assume that knowledge of organisational
practice is always partial and imperfect and so focus
considerable attention on identifying any discrepancies
between the practices that are described in incident re-
ports and those that are specified in formal manuals and
standard procedures. Even minor discrepancies, such as
the order in which bolts are routinely replaced in a
maintenance task, can cause serious concern. These dis-
crepancies will typically prompt a detailed investigation
of the nature of the ‘real-world’ practical work involved,
along with careful examination of the formal procedures
that are intended to guide this work, to ensure that both
are aligned, reliable and mutually supportive [43, 62].
Analysing this mismatch allows broader reflection on
the nature of the problems identified and wider system
vulnerabilities. However, typically, the accepted standard
of care is taken as a given and the analysis examines rea-
sons for departure from that standard. The conclusion
of the investigation may simply be that staff did not
comply with standard procedures without any consider-
ation of the workability of those procedures [63] or the
context and circumstances in which the care was deliv-
ered. Adherence to processes and standards is rightly
ingrained in the professional training of nurses and other
professions which may make such reflections appear
non-professional. Investigations therefore need to look
more closely not only at the reasons for departures from
standard procedures but at the standards and procedures
themselves [64]. This is a subtle but important change of
analytic stance. When analytical efforts are directed at
identifying and understanding the mismatch between ex-
pected organisational work and the real situated prac-
tices of professionals, it simultaneously allows both to be
updated, improved and revised. There is potential for
using this perspective more actively in longer term re-
views of safety issues to highlight the workability or un-
workability of the intended care processes and so to
develop smarter ways of working that are more aligned
to human capacities.
Broaden our repertoire of responses and recommendations
Investigations have to be completed in a timely manner
and the immediate priority is often to provide assurance
to hospital patient safety committees, commissioners
and regulators that action plans have been generated
and recommendations have been implemented. In their
turn, committees and regulators seek assurance that the
plan has been actioned in a timely manner, an approach
which is guaranteed to encourage simple recommenda-
tions that avoid thorny system problems. Reviews of rec-
ommendations generated by incident analysis have
found that most recommendations are weak and few ad-
dress fundamental system issues [5, 21, 44]. There is lit-
tle understanding that people-focused solutions [65, 66]
like adding in another double-check, re-writing the
safety procedure, creating a new safety procedure or
sending out an email reminder to staff are weak and will
not in themselves lead to sustained improvements. Studies
of successful improvement and behaviour change suggest
that even when basic procedures are very well understood
considerable work is needed both to understand reasons
for non-compliance and to bring about change. Such
changes, in the case of hand hygiene for instance, often
require long term multi-faceted interventions which em-
brace cognitive, social and emotional determinants of be-
haviour all set within a wider organisational strategy with
highly visible leadership commitment [67–70].
Analysts use frameworks of contributory factors to
guide the investigation of incidents and we may need to
also use frameworks of solutions and interventions to
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ensure that all potentially relevant interventions are con-
sidered [71]. We have previously distinguished five broad
strategies each associated with a family of interventions
[4]. The first two strategies aim to optimise care, im-
proving both safety and efficiency; the first strategy is to
target specific harms or specific clinical processes and
the second aims at the improvement of the underlying
work systems and processes. These two broad strategies
are complemented by strategies that are more concerned
with detecting and responding to risk and which assume,
particularly in a time of rising demand and financial aus-
terity, that care will often be delivered in difficult work-
ing conditions. These three additional strategies are risk
control; monitoring, adaptation and response; and mi-
tigation. Each of these is associated with a family of
specific interventions. Reports after incident analyses
typically consider only a very few of the dozens of poten-
tial strategies and interventions available. The develop-
ment of frameworks of contributory factors 20 years ago
[7] helped us structure investigation and ensure a com-
prehensive exploration of relevant issues; we now need
to draw on a menu of safety interventions which we can
review when considering what actions might be required
following analyses of patient journeys.
Conclusions
Healthcare is changing rapidly with more care being
provided in the home and community to an ageing
population suffering chronic diseases over long time pe-
riods. Our previous concepts of quality and safety have
to evolve to reflect these changes. Rather than thinking
primarily in terms of specific incidents, we need to con-
sider the balance of benefit and harm over long time pe-
riods and encompass the social and psychological
impact of healthcare as well as physical effects. We have
argued that we need to look at the evolution of patient
journeys in much greater depth, be more proportionate
and strategic in analysing safety issues, assume that pa-
tients and families will be partners in investigation, seek
to understand success and recovery as well as failure
and develop a much broader and more thoughtful ap-
proach to recommendations (Table 2). The longer term
perspective has important implications for the subse-
quent safety strategies that we implement. These
changes are profound and will require major adjust-
ments in both practical and cultural terms and research
to explore and evaluate the most effective approaches.
First and foremost, the involvement of patients and
families will need to become the default option in an in-
vestigation. This has already been mandated by the
Dutch Safety Inspectorate, with the important proviso
that healthcare organisations do not have to involve pa-
tients and families where there is good reason not to do
so [38]. The routine inclusion of patients and families in
inquiries should increase the attention given to emo-
tional and social aspects of care and give more emphasis
to communication and coordination of care over time
and across organisations. We will need to develop new
approaches to analyses which allow the inclusion of pa-
tient perspectives without burdening families unduly.
Second, everyone involved in investigation needs to re-
flect on what proportion of the current investigative ac-
tivity is really meaningful and how information gained
from incident analysis should be linked to system im-
provement. The effectiveness of investigations needs to
be evaluated in terms of the quality of the analysis and
the depth and seriousness of the ultimate recommenda-
tions rather than simply in terms of meeting deadlines
and the signing off action plans. Both regulators and
healthcare organisations also need to realise that
Table 2 Seven major changes in adverse event analysis
Change in practice Current Future
Select some events identified by
patients and families
Decision to investigate determined by
organisational and regulatory priorities
Select some events with longer term chronologies identified
by patients and families Ask patients to tell their story of the
episode of care, focusing both on what went well and poorly.
Widen the time frame of analysis:
review the patient journey
Determine recent accident chronology Widen the timeframe to the whole patient journey
Fewer, deeper analyses Give equal attention to all serious incidents Prioritise events which must be explained to patients and
families, thereafter, triage events to identify those with
maximum potential for system-wide learning
Success and failure in detection and
recovery
Identify problems in process of care and
contributory factors
Identify benefits of care as well as problems, and include
detection and recovery from problems
Examining safety issues and
contributory factors at different time
points
Identify contributory factors Identify contributory factors to each individual problem and
to detection and recovery
Reflecting on the workability of the
underlying care process
Assume the current standard of care as a
given
Reflect on the feasibility and workability of current standards
and practices and whether these need to be adjusted
Broadening our repertoire of responses
and recommendations
Recommendations and developing an
action plan
Select from the full portfolio of strategies and interventions
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generating recommendations on the basis of a single in-
cident may not be optimal. Aggregate analyses of safety
investigations over a year, integrated with other related
safety and quality data, will allow examination of major
system issues and the production of more meaningful
action plans [6, 8, 72, 73]. For instance, poorly organised
handover may be a factor in multiple safety incidents
but be regarded as too difficult to tackle in a single inci-
dent action plan. A hospital reviewing a year’s worth of
events however can see a pattern emerging and prepare
a serious plan for improving handover across the whole
organisation.
Third, safety analyses are commonly limited by the
boundaries of the organisations in which the ultimate
harm occurred. Analysing the patient journey, and see-
ing safety through the eyes of the patient, will necessitate
the development of more sophisticated ways of conduct-
ing safety analyses across organisations including the
home and community environment. Such activities will
likely require the building of new investigative infra-
structures, along with the development of norms and so-
cial agreements that support data sharing, collaborative
analysis and coordinated improvement across organisa-
tional boundaries. This broader approach will require a
new type of forum, supported by technical tools such as
video conferencing, covering longer periods in the pa-
tient’s medical history and involving the participation of
both hospital and community practitioners jointly with
relatives and the patient. It would also require the devel-
opment of new indicators and electronic traces, such as
tools to monitor individual patients’ laboratory results,
to record the nature and duration of all breakdowns in
the continuum of care.
Fourth, implementing some of the changes we propose
also requires us to improve the evidence available to those
who lead safety analyses. Compared with other industries,
healthcare investigations use a limited evidence base
mainly consisting of the medical record and unstructured
interviews [43, 74, 75]. The limited scope of information
and evidence is a major contributor to the limited nature
of many investigations and the lack of attention to system
issues. All too often, current investigations are superficial
because the quality of the evidence available to those lead-
ing the analysis is fragmented across different IT systems
used by multiple providers or is of poor quality; for ex-
ample, the scenario in which a medication error occurs
and the infusion device memory has a 4-h capacity and an
automatic over-ride built in, so the actual dose adminis-
tered to a patient is never known because the device’s
memory has been over-written by the time the investiga-
tion commences. With the introduction of new technolo-
gies and information systems, there are considerable
opportunities to support the capture, retention and ana-
lysis of safety-relevant data [76, 77].
We recognise that the challenges of analysing even a
small proportion of safety issues over longer time pe-
riods are considerable. Even with active patient and fam-
ily involvement, it will be hard to track all relevant
clinical information and to get an accurate sequence of
events and contributory factors. In the British NHS and
other national systems, the patient is at least notionally
receiving care from a single provider although in prac-
tice the care is often provided by a mixture of publicly
funded healthcare, social services and private providers.
The challenges will be greater still in more fragmented
systems such as the USA where the patient may receive
care from a number of disparate and often unconnected
healthcare providers. Even within those integrated sys-
tems in the USA, such as the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) healthcare system, patients can receive care
delivered or managed by the VA but also care from other
providers for which VA has no regulatory authority. In
many cases, it would not be clear who might initiate
such safety analyses or be accountable for any identified
system improvements. We would suggest however that
it is nevertheless critical to attempt these analyses across
multiple providers because this is the reality that pa-
tients and families face as they navigate these complex
systems. We believe that many major safety issues are
currently neglected precisely because they concern the
coordination and integration of care across multiple
providers.
Finally, there is a need for significant research and in-
vestment in the development of both current and new
approaches. While the methods of incident analysis pro-
posed 20 years ago have spread widely, there has been
distressingly little research into the concepts, methods,
reliability and outcomes of such analyses. We need, for
instance, to develop and evaluate means of involving pa-
tients and families, to develop methods of assessing and
monitoring the quality of investigations and to consider
how the reliability and validity of the findings and recom-
mendations from investigations might be meaningfully
assessed. This period of revision offers an opportunity for
a more critical and scientific vision to emerge which is
truly linked to organisation and system-wide learning and
improvement.
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